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RECENT CASES
EVIDENCE-EXCLUSIONARY RULES OF CRIMINAL LAW
ARE NOT PART OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS IN
STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS-Emslie v. State
Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 210, 520 P.2d 991, 113 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1974).
In May, 1969, two Las Vegas hotel security guards observed
California attorney William G. Emslie picking up a room key near
the hotel swimming pool. Because a number of hotel rooms had
been burglarized with stolen keys, the guards detained Emslie,
searched him, and found eight more keys. They turned him over
to the Las Vegas sheriff's department. Acting on information
from the manager of Emslie's hotel, officers located his car, im-
pounded it, and searched it without a warrant. The trunk con-
tained fifty-two more room keys.
The next day, after being advised of his Miranda rights and
waiving counsel, Emslie confessed to numerous burglaries. A
search warrant prepared on the basis of this information and
served on a Las Vegas jeweler turned up stolen property pur-
chased from Emslie. Some of the items were identified by Emslie
as having been taken from specific rooms he had burglarized.
However, the charges filed in Las Vegas in June, 1969, were later
dismissed.'
In November, 1970, the California State Bar disciplinary
committee began a series of hearings to determine whether disci-
plinary action should be taken. Emslie denied all charges and
made a motion to exclude the evidence of stolen property as the
product of an unlawful search and seizure. The motion was
denied and a recommendation of disbarment made by the com-
mittee to the California Supreme Court.2
1. Emslie was released on his own recognizance on condition that he seek
psychiatric assistance; he complied. Five months later, on motion of the Las Ve-
gas district attorney's office, charges were dismissed because of insufficient evi-
dence. Emslie v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 210, 218, 520 P.2d 991, 994, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 175, 178 (1974).
2. The disciplinary committee of the State Bar, acting for the Board of Gov-
ernors as an administrative arm of the California Supreme Court, is empowered
to conduct disciplinary hearings. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6044 (West 1970).
Upon finding of misconduct, the committee may make recommendation of suspen-
sion or disbarment to the supreme court if such penalty is warranted. CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6078 (West 1970). Final determination is for the court, which
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The court, after rejecting the unlawful search argument,3
proceeded to give careful consideration to the general applicability
of exclusionary rules to State Bar disciplinary hearings. It con-
cluded that these rules are not part of administrative due process
reviews the record of the disciplinary proceedings and reaches an independent
judgment. Bernstein v. State Bar, 6 Cal. 3d 909, 495 P.2d 1289, 101 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1972).
3. To uphold the warrantless vehicle search the court cited Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). (Chambers held that where there is probable cause
to search a car stopped on the highway, and the opportunity to search is "fleet-
ing," officers may choose to impound the vehicle and search it later at the police
station without obtaining a warrant.) The Emslie court declared that removing
Emslie's rented automobile from a hotel parking area to a police lot and subse-
quently searching it without a warrant was no infringement on the defendant's
rights "beyond that which would have resulted had a warrant authorizing the im-
poundment and search first been obtained." 11 Cal. 3d at 223, 520 P.2d at 998,
113 Cal. Rptr. at 182. The only "exigent circumstance" the court noted was that
a deputy sheriff said he thought the car might contain contraband which would
easily be removed by an accomplice.
This interpretation of Chambers appears to reduce the exigent circum-
stances requirement in vehicle search cases ("fleeting opportunity to search") to
a nullity. Emslie was in custody when the sheriff learned of the car's existence;
he had cooperated to the extent of consenting to a search of his hotel room con-
taining stolen goods, and nothing indicates that the deputy sheriff in fact had any
reason to believe there was an accomplice. A year earlier the court had handed
down a consistent ruling on similar facts in People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512
P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973) (warrantless search of an automobile
parked near defendant's apartment building after defendant had been arrested in
the apartment).
Discounting the phantom accomplice in Emslie (who can be conjured up at
need by any enterprising policeman), the holdings in Emslie and Dumas would
appear to reduce the theoretical mobility of any automobile to an almost auto-
matic equality with "exigent circumstances"--an extension not justified by the
facts of the Chambers case and expressly rejected by the plurality opinion in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Speaking for the majority
in Chambers, Mr. Justice White stated, "[Only in exigent circumstances will the
judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as sufficient authorization for
a search," 399 U.S. at 51, and emphasized that Chambers does not "require or
suggest that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an automobile may
be made without the extra protection for privacy which a warrant affords." Id.
at 50.
Since the Chambers decision, the California courts have recited the "exigent
circumstances" formula in numerous vehicle search cases, but most of the cases
in which the search has been approved clearly have involved some element of ur-
gency other than the inherent mobility of an automobile. See, e.g., People v.
Lauresen, 8 Cal. 3d 192, 501 P.2d 1145, 104 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972) (suspects at
large in vicinity of abandoned car); People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d
1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972) (search of package consigned to carrier on
Chambers "fleeting opportunity" rationale); People v. Lovejoy, 12 Cal. App. 3d
883, 91 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1970) (car stopped on the highway, accomplices known
to be at large in another vehicle). See also People v. Medina, 7 Cal. 3d 30, 496
P.2d 433, 101 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1972), for a general statement of the primacy of
the warrant requirement. Faced, however, with a situation in which the necessity
of immediate search is virtually nonexistent, the courts seem willing to go far be-
yond both the language and the facts of Chambers in authorizing warrantless
search. See People v. Dumas, supra; People v. Medina, 26 Cal. App. 3d 809, 103
Cal. Rptr. 337 (1972); People v. Gurley, 23 Cal. App. 3d 536, 100 Cal. Rptr.
407 (1972).
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in such proceedings.'
The court's analysis turned on the nature and function of dis-
ciplinary proceedings. There is some precedent for prohibiting
on constitutional grounds the use of evidence obtained by unlaw-
ful search and seizure in civil and administrative actions which
share some of the key objectives of a criminal trial. The strongest
and most consistent line of decisions is in the area of civil for-
feiture proceedings. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsyl-
vania,5 a case involving an illegal search of a vehicle by state of-
ficers, the United States Supreme Court held that the government
could not make use of illegally obtained evidence (liquor on
which federal taxes had not been paid) by waiving the criminal
penalty and proceeding to confiscate -the automobile in a civil
action.6  The Court held that despite the "civil" label, the object
of a forfeiture action is to punish the commission of a criminal
offense and impose a serious penalty. 7  Given the "quasi-crim-
inal" nature of the proceeding, the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary privilege is available. One year earlier the California Supreme
Court had applied -the same rationale to forfeiture actions in state
courts and, in People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe,8 had reached
the same conclusion: forfeiture proceedings, though technically
civil, are deterrent in nature and bear such close resemblance to
the aims and objectives of the criminal law as to require applica-
tion of criminal exclusionary rules barring evidence acquired by
illegal search.9
4. The court noted that the issue is "directly raised" by the Emslie case, and
is "of sufficient importance to require consideration here." 11 Cal. 3d at 226,
520 P.2d at 1000, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 184. Since the illegality issue had been dis-
posed of, making it unnecessary for the court to rule on the applicability of the
exclusionary rules, its conclusion is dictum. People v. Gregg, 5 Cal. App. 3d 502,
85 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1970). However, since the court gave full and careful consid-
eration to an issue argued by counsel, and announced a principle upon which it
might have decided the case had it been necessary to reach the issue, its conclu-
sion is authoritative. People v. Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 503 P.2d 257, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1972); San Joaquin & Kings River C. & I. Co. v. Stanislaus County, 155
Cal. 21, 99 P. 365 (1908).
5. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
6. Use of illegally seized evidence in federal court criminal proceedings had
long been prohibited by the rule laid down in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States Supreme
Court held that the privilege of excluding evidence obtained by illegal search and
seizure was an essential part of the right of privacy guaranteed by the fourth
amendment and therefore was binding on both federal and state courts.
7. 380 U.S. at 700. The Court noted that not infrequently the forfeiture
of an automobile carrying contraband may constitute a greater penalty than the
criminal law could impose, since the value of the car might exceed the maximum
fine. Id. at 701.
8. 62 Cal. 2d 92, 396 P.2d 706, 41 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1964). State narcotics
agents sought to introduce illegally seized evidence in civil proceedings to confis-
cate a car used to transport marijuana.
9. Id. at 96, 396 P.2d at 709, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
19751
SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 15
The California court has also declared products of unlawful
search and seizure inadmissible on constitutional grounds in a few
other types of civil cases, notably narcotics commitment hearings.
In People v. Moore,1° the defendant's motion for exclusion of il-
legally seized evidence in a narcotics commitment proceeding was
upheld on the ground that the action, though civil, involved an
attempt by the state to deprive the defendant of his liberty. The
fact that commitment proceedings can result in involuntary con-
finement for a substantial period was sufficient, in the court's
judgment, to constitute such identity with -the objectives of the
criminal law as to make application of the exclusionary rule a
necessary element of due process. In addition, the court found
such application consistent with the basic function of the exclu-
sionary rule: deterrence of police misconduct.
The Emslie court, therefore, was faced with the problem of
determining whether the policy outlined in One Cadillac Coupe
and broadened in Moore, which requires exclusion of illegally
seized evidence in civil actions bearing a close resemblance to
10. 69 Cal. 2d 674, 466 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968). But cf. People
v. Bourdon, 10 Cal. App. 3d 878, 89 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1970) (holding that a motion
to exclude on grounds that evidence was illegally seized must be made at the hear-
ing before the judge on statutory compliance, not at the jury trial). See also Red-
ner v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 5 Cal. 3d 83, 485 P.2d 799, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 447 (1971) (alternative holding: evidence obtained by gross invasion of
defendant's privacy contaminates and subverts Board function); Elder v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 241 Cal. App. 2d 246, 50 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1001 (1967) (fourth amendment exclusionary rule assumed to apply in
proceedings by Board of Medical Examiners to deprive a physician of his license).
Several other jurisdictions have extended the protection of the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule to the defendant in a civil or administrative action in
which a state agency seeks to impose a penalty or revoke a license. E.g., Knoll
Associates, Inc. v. F.T.C., 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (anti-trust action, docu-
ments stolen by defendant's employee with intent to aid prosecutor excluded);
Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (Ist Cir. 1938) (civil suit by United States
Treasury to recover customs tax); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky.
1962) (civil suit by United States to collect wagering tax); Ex parte Jackson, 263
F. Supp. 110 (D.C. Mont. 1920) (deportation proceeding); Carlisle v. State, 276
Ala. 436, 163 So. 2d 596 (1964) (civil action to abate a gambling nuisance);
Finn's Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liquor Authority, 31 App. Div. 2d 15, 294
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1968) (state liquor license suspension); Leogrande v. State Liquor
Authority, 25 App. Div. 2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1966), rev'd on other grounds,
19 N.Y.2d 418, 280 N.Y.S.2d 381, 227 N.E.2d 302 (1967) (state liquor license
suspension). A very few state courts have even excluded on fourth amendment
grounds evidence illegally obtained by a private party for use in a purely civil
action to which the state is not a party. E.g., Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427,
93 N.W.2d 281 (1958) (wrongful death tort action, blood sample taken from un-
conscious defendant during emergency treatment by doctor held inadmissible to
prove intoxication); Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622
(1966) (letter proving wife's adultery, stolen by husband, excluded from child-
custody hearing). But such instances are distinct exceptions to the prevailing
rule. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); People v. Superior Court,
70 Cal. 2d 123, 449 P.2d 230, 74 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1969).
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criminal trials, should be further extended to State Bar disciplinary
hearings which contemplate suspension or disbarment.
Though the court made no mention of conflicting decisions
at the appellate level," the same type of issue (application of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule in proceedings to revoke a
professional license) had previously been presented to the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal. In Elder v. Board of Medical Examin-
ers, 2 which involved proceedings to revoke a physician's license
to practice, the Court of Appeal for the First District made a direct
analogy to the civil forfeiture cases. The court interpreted One
Cadillac Coupe'3 as requiring exclusion of unlawfully seized evi-
dence in any civil or administrative proceeding which shares the
deterrent and punitive objectives of a criminal action and threat-
ens deprivation of liberty or property. Consequently, the court
stated that "it will be assumed herein that the exclusionary rule
will apply to an administrative hearing when the proceeding con-
templates the deprivation of a license which is recognized as a
property right, as is the right to practice medicine."' 4
The Court of Appeal for the Second District, however, re-
fused to recognize the forfeiture decisions as controlling precedent
in a case involving a nearly identical fact situation, Board of Gov-
ernors of the Mountain View School District v. Metcalf. 5 Up-
holding the school board's dismissal of a probationary teacher fol-
lowing his conviction of a criminal offense, the appellate court
ruled that evidence of Metcalf's conduct "that was inadmissible
in his criminal prosecution [because the product of an illegal
search by police] was properly admitted in this dismissal pro-
ceeding."'" Conceding the punitive effect of revoking a teaching
11. The Emslie court cites and discusses Elder v. Board of Medical Exam-
iners, 241 Cal. App. 2d 246, 50 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1966) (see note 12 infra and
accompanying text). However, there is no reference to Board of Governors of
the Mountain View School Dist. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1974) (see text accompanying note 15 infra). The Metcalf decision, which
was handed down three months before the Emslie ruling, is in direct conflict with
Elder on the issue of application of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to
license revocation proceedings.
12. 241 Cal. App. 2d 246, 50 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1001 (1967). Agents of the State Board of Medical Examiners, accompanied by
two policemen, raided defendant's office without a warrant and seized files on pa-
tients for whom Elder had prescribed methadrine. Defendant challenged use of
the illegally procured records in the disciplinary proceedings instituted to consider
revoking his license. Though the court accepted defendant's argument that the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule should apply to the proceeding, it subse-
quently ruled the search and seizure legal.
13. 62 Cal. 2d 92, 396 P.2d 706, 41 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1964).
14. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 260, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
15. 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1974).
16. Id. at 552, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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credential, the court stressed that the primary purpose of dis-
missing a teacher for misconduct is not to punish the teacher but
to protect his pupils. The regulatory character of the disciplinary
proceedings, in the court's estimation, overrode any "quasi-crim-
inal" elements. In addition, the Metcalf court found that the
policy of deterring official misconduct, which is the backbone of
,the criminal law exclusionary rules, has little relevance in the con-
text of school board disciplinary hearings.
The Emslie court, resolving the same issue with regard to
State Bar disciplinary hearings, expressly rejected 'the Elder
court's assumption that disciplinary proceedings are directly anal-
ogous to civil forfeiture actions and thus require application of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule as a necessary element of
procedural due process. 7  Instead it adopted the Metcalf court's
approach and undertook a careful analysis of the nature and func-
tion of disbarment proceedings.' 8
An early line of California State Bar disciplinary cases
stressed the punitive nature of disbarment proceedings, character-
izing them as "quasi-criminal" 9 or "in the nature of a criminal
prosecution. ' 20  However, these cases pre-date both People v.
Cahan,2' which required exclusion of illegally seized evidence
from California criminal trials, and Mapp v. Ohio,22 which applied
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to state courts.
The practice in the older cases of comparing Bar disciplinary
hearings to criminal trials did not raise the issue of exclusion, be-
cause before Cahan unlawfully seized evidence was not exclud-
able even in criminal trials in California courts, except where there
was flagrant police misconduct. The criminal analogy was drawn
primarily to establish and support the necessity for such ele-
mentary procedural safeguards as notice, right to counsel, and ex-
17. 11 Cal. 3d at 229, 520 P.2d at 1001, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
18. State Bar disciplinary proceedings are statutory, governed by the State Bar
Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6001 et seq. (West 1970). The Rules of Pro-
cedure of the State Bar, Id. foil. § 6087, establish minimum standards for pro-
cedural due process in disciplinary hearings. Rules governing procedure in civil
and criminal cases are therefore not applicable unless specifically made so by leg-
islative action. Id. § 6001. However, the supreme court retains inherent super-
visory power over such matters, Id. § 6087, and has the power to supplement the
statutory provisions with additional procedural requirements "if it is not satisfied
that the legislative qualifications are sufficient." Emslie v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d
210, 225, 520 P.2d 991, 999, 113 Cal. Rptr. 175, 183 (1974).
19. E.g., Herrscher v. State Bar, 4 Cal. 2d 399, 49 P.2d 832 (1935); In re
Morton, 179 Cal. 510, 177 P. 453 (1918); In re Luce, 83 Cal. 303, 23 P. 350
(1890).
20. E.g., In re Haymond, 121 Cal. 385, 53 P. 899 (1898).
21. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
22. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Mapp holding makes no explicit distinctionbqetwcn criminal and ii act ,
[Vol. 15
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clusion of hearsay testimony. In a 1935 disbarment review in
which an attorney did seek to have illegally procured evidence
suppressed, basing his argument on the procedure obtaining in
federal courts under the rule of Weeks v. United States,23 the
California Supreme Court acknowledged the punitive effect of the
disciplinary hearing and accepted the "quasi-criminal" label. But
it disposed of the motion to suppress by simply reciting the com-
mon law rule, then in force in state courts, that a court presented
with competent evidence will not stop to investigate its source.24
The Emslie opinion rejects the criminal/quasi-criminal label
and takes the position asserted by the more recent California Bar
cases: the essential purpose of disbarment is not to impose a
penalty on the offender but -to preserve -the integrity of the judicial
system and protect the public from unethical and incompetent
practitioners.25
This rejection of the criminal analogy, and consequently of
any constitutional requirement that criminal exclusionary rules be
applied in all cases, is clearly in accord with current case law in
California and other jurisdictions. 26  However, a 1968 United
States Supreme Court decision, In re Ruffalo, contains an express
statement that disbarment is a "penalty" and proceedings which
contemplate disbarment are "quasi-criminal in nature. 27  Conse-
quently, the Court held that an attorney must be given advance
23. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks required the exclusion in federal prosecu-
tions of evidence acquired by unlawful search and seizure.
24. Herrscher v. State Bar, 4 Cal. 2d 399, 49 P.2d 832 (1935). Private de-
tective hired by an irate client broke into Herrscher's office and photostated his
personal and business files. The stolen records were later studied by the Exam-
iner in Bar disciplinary proceedings. Ruling on the motion to suppress, the court
held that the illegal act and the use of the stolen papers by the disciplinary com-
mittee were "distinct transactions" with "no necessary connection."
25. Emslie v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 210, 520 P.2d 991, 113 Cal. Rptr. 175
(1974). Accord, Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 676, 499 P.2d 968, 103 Cal. Rptr.
288 (1972); Zitny v. State Bar, 64 Cal. 2d 787, 415 P.2d 521, 51 Cal. Rptr. 825
(1966).
26. See, e.g., Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 676, 499 P.2d 968, 103 Cal. Rptr.
288 (1972); In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1973); State Bar Grievance
Adm'r v. Jackson, 390 Mich. 147, 211 N.W.2d 38 (1973); In re Daly, 291 Minn.
490, 189 N.W.2d 176 (1971); Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 296 N.Y.S.2d
937, 244 N.E.2d 456 (1968); Drake v. State, 488 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1972); Com-
mittee on Legal Ethics v. Graziani, 200 S.E.2d 353 (W. Va. 1973).
27. 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968). The Ruffalo opinion concerns a federal dis-
barment, but the federal court proceedings consisted merely of a review of the
record of the state court action, and a finding that one of the three charges con-
stituting grounds for expulsion from the Ohio State Bar was sufficient for federal
disbarment. The error on which defendant challenged the federal disbarment
(failure to give timely notice of charge) occurred in the original State Bar disci-
plinary hearing. Thus the Supreme Court's characterization of disciplinary ac-
tions as quasi-criminal is clearly intended to apply to both state and federal pro-
ceedings.
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
notice of all charges brought against him in disbarment proceed-
ings. The Emslie opinion made reference to Rulfalo, but dis-
missed it with the terse observation that it "hardly stands for the
equation of criminal and disciplinary proceedings. '28  However,
it is not clear that Ruffalo should have been dismissed as irrele-
vant to the issue. It must be conceded that any argument that
the Ruffalo opinion does "equate" disciplinary hearings with crim-
inal trials rests solely on the Court's use of the label "quasi-crim-
inal." If by using that phrase the Supreme Court intended to
place disbarment proceedings in the same category as civil for-
feiture actions, also labeled "quasi-criminal," then Ruffalo sug-
gests that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule may be part
of minimal due process requirements, as it is in forfeiture ac-
tions. 9 Ruffalo contains no discussion of the implications of
"quasi-criminal," and there is no clear indication that the words
were meant as a term of art or that the Court's intention was to
broaden the category of non-criminal proceedings subject to the
exclusionary rule of the criminal law. Moreover, those state
courts which have considered the ramifications of Ruffalo have,
like the California Supreme Court, uniformly treated the language
as dictum and summarily rejected the suggestion that Ruffalo re-
quires the application of criminal procedural rules in Bar disci-
plinary hearings.30  But if disbarment proceedings share the aims
and objectives of the criminal law ("quasi-criminal"), it is not
clear why an accused attorney should not have the benefit not only
of timely notice of charges, which Ruffalo requires, but of other
procedural protections afforded criminal defendants who may face
penalties considerably less severe than the loss of livelihood that
disbarment entails.
The answer offered by the Emslie court is that the ultimate
test of whether a particular procedural rule should be applied is
a practical one."' Thus, as the final step in its determination, the
court weighed the regulatory function of disciplinary actions
against the primary policy consideration behind the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule: deterrence of police misconduct. 2 In
support of its decision the court relied extensively on In re Mar-
tinez," a case in which the court "applied this balancing test...
28. 11 Cal. 3d at 229, 520 P.2d at 1002, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
29. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
30. Cases cited at note 25 supra.
31. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
32. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d
434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); People
v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
33. 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 851 (1971).
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in considering the nature of an administrative proceeding-a
parole revocation by the Adult Authority." 4
Martinez, a parolee, was convicted of a narcotics offense, and
his parole revoked. The conviction was later reversed on deter-
mination that the evidence admitted at the trial was the product
of an unlawful search, and that the defendant's confession had
been obtained in violation of the Dorado-Miranda rules.35
On appeal, the supreme court held that the Adult Authority
was entitled to consider the illegally seized evidence and the con-
fession during parole revocation proceedings. The rationale was
that both -the fourth amendment and the Dorado-Miranda ex-
clusionary rules sought to deter unlawful police practices. In the
judgment of the court, that policy would not be implemented by
requiring application of those rules in Adult Authority hearings.
The court reasoned that since a police officer is unlikely to predi-
cate his unlawful act on the victim's status as parolee, the increase
in deterrence achieved by excluding illegally obtained evidence
from Adult Authority hearings would be minimal, while the
hampering effect on an administrative body charged with the
"delicate duty" of deciding whether a convicted criminal can be
released without danger to the public would be substantial. De-
spite a vigorous dissent from Justice Peters, 36 the court concluded
that the exclusionary rules do not apply to Adult Authority pro-
ceedings, except where serious violation of the parolee's rights ab-
solutely requires exclusion to assure a fair hearing.I
34. Emslie v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 210, 227, 520 P.2d 991, 1000, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 175, 184 (1974).
35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d
338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
36. Justice Peters argued persuasively that if exclusionary rules are to func-
tion successfully as deterrents, courts must enforce them so broadly as to make
any use of illegally obtained evidence impossible. Permitting the state to profit
in any way from unconstitutional methods weakens the overall deterrent effect and
creates incentive for illegal activity. Peters also pointed out that the majority
opinion, focusing on the deterrent function of exclusionary rules, gives short thrift
to an equally important consideration: preservation of judicial integrity. Noting
that the purpose of parole proceedings is to facilitate rehabilitation, he suggested
that toleration of government lawlessness is peculiarly inappropriate in such a set-
ting. The civil forfeiture cases, in Peters' opinion, indicate that exclusionary rules
ought properly to be applied in analogous non-criminal proceedings. In re Marti-
nez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 652, 463 P.2d 734, 741, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 389 (1970) (dis-
senting opinion).
37. The court actually resolved the issue of the Dorado-Miranda violation by
refusing to apply Dorado retroactively. The narcotics arrest which later resulted
in parole revocation took place in 1963. The Dorado decision was handed down
in 1965, Miranda in 1966. Dorado's companion case, In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d
368, 398 P.2d 380, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1965), held that Dorado contemplated de-
terring future police misconduct and declined to make the rule retroactive. The
United States Supreme Court made the same ruling with respect to Miranda viola-
1975]
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Applying the same test to the issue raised in Emslie, the
court reached an identical conclusion: for the State Bar discipli-
nary committee to perform its protective and regulatory duties
with maximum efficiency, it should be permitted to assess all
competent evidence available, unrestricted by procedural rules not
consonant with its function. The court expressly cautioned that
Emslie was not ,to be construed as holding that "circumstances
could not be presented under which the constitutional demands
of due process could not countenance use of evidence obtained
by unlawful means in a proceeding conducted by [a] govern-
mental agency or administrative arm of this court." But the opin-
ion continued: "The application of such rules must be worked
out on a case-by-case basis in this and other license revocation
proceedings.''38
The Emslie ruling is limited to State Bar disciplinary pro-
ceedings, and serves primarily as a directive to the disciplinary
committee of the Bar, which exercises administrative and advisory
duties in matters of suspension and disbarment. 3 However, the
court's adoption of the policy-weighing procedure used in Marti-
nez clearly delineates the approach -the California Supreme Court
will favor in cases involving an attempt to apply criminal pro-
cedural rules to administrative proceedings. The court appears
to have balked at any absolute extension of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule beyond the limits of Moore and One 1960 Cadil-
lac Coupe. It has chosen instead a cautious case-by-case ap-
proach, at least where the administrative body has as its primary
function protection of the public, and the threatened penalty,
-though severe, is neither deprivation of physical liberty nor confis-
cation of tangible property. Such an approach may facilitate the
regulatory work of disciplinary boards. But the price of this con-
cession to practical necessity is that -the integrity of the state is
undermined when it permits its administrative agencies to wield
the disciplinary rod with unclean hands.
Christine de Shazer
tions in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). However, the Martinez
holding is clearly intended by the court to cover both Dorado-Miranda and fourth
amendment exclusionary rules.
38. 11 Cal. 3d at 229-30, 520 P.2d at 1002, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
39. See discussion at note 2 supra.
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LOSS OF CONSORTIUM-EITHER SPOUSE IS ENTITLED
TO RECOVER FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CAUSED BY
THE NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL INJURY TO HIS OR
HER SPOUSE BY A THIRD PARTY-Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765
(1974).
While at work in 1969, Richard Rodriguez, age 22, was
struck on the head by a falling pipe which weighed over 600
pounds.' As result, his spinal cord was severely damaged and
he suffered apparently permanent paralysis in his legs, lower body
and part of one arm.2 After the accident, Mary Anne Rodriguez,
age 20, quit her job to provide her bedridden husband with the
continual care his injuries required.' She had to assist him in vir-
tually every aspect of daily living, including washing, dressing, and
getting into and out of his bed or wheelchair.' In addition, she
had to wake him several times each night and turn him over in
an effort to prevent bedsores. Since Richard no longer had control
over his bowels or bladder, Mary Anne had to provide artificial
inducement to help him perform the basic bodily function of waste
disposal." The performance of all these duties constituted an
enormous physical strain on Mary Anne.'
Just as serious, however, was the psychological suffering she
was compelled to endure.7 She had to witness her husband's own
physical and mental suffering each day.8 Furthermore, due to
Richard's inability to participate in sexual relations after the acci-
dent, Mary Anne could not have the children she desired.9 In
effect, a normal marriage relationship had been destroyed and re-
placed by a nurse-patient relationship. Her own physical and
emotional stress which resulted from her husband's accident, and
the knowledge that Richard would require her constant attention
for the rest of his life, caused Mary Anne to become "'nervous,
tense [and] depressed.' "10 As she stated in her complaint, "Rich-
ard's life has been ruined by this accident. As his partner, my life
has been ruined too."'
1. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 385, 525 P.2d 669,
670, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 766 (1974).
2. Id. at 386, 525 P.2d at 670, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 386, 525 P.2d at 670-71, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766-67.
6. Id. at 386, 525 P.2d at 671, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. ld.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Richard and Mary Anne jointly filed an amended complaint
alleging two causes of action.12 The first was predicated on Rich-
ard's own injuries.18 The second cause of action alleged separate
consequential damages to Mary Anne.' 4 She sought general
damages in her own right, recovery for the value of her nursing
services, and compensation for her lost earnings and future earn-
ing capacity. 5 The defendants demurred to the second cause of
action on the basis of the supreme court's holding in Deshotel v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.,'0 which had denied
a wife the right to recover damages for loss of consortium. 17 The
trial court reluctantly followed this rule, 8 but in order to allow
Mary Anne an immediate appeal, it severed the two causes of ac-
tion and sustained the demurrer to her action without leave to
amend. 9 The court of appeal unanimously affirmed, stating that
it was the task of the California Supreme Court to qualify or over-
rule its own earlier decisions.20
The supreme court granted a hearing, and in its decision, per
Justice Mosk, stated that the lower courts had correctly deferred
the resolution of the issue 2 but held unequivocally that either
spouse may recover for the loss of consortium caused by the negli-
gent or intentional injury of the other spouse by a third party. -2
12. Id. at 387, 525 P.2d at 671, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. At the end of the opinion, the court discussed the plaintiff's prayer for
damages alleged in the complaint. The court found the prayer for general dam-
ages acceptable and permitted the plaint'ff, upon retrial, to offer proof of her loss
of consortium. However, the court held that the plaintiff could not recover for
the value of the nursing services she furnished her husband, because, if her hus-
band succeeded in his action against the defendants, he would be entitled to re-
cover the cost of those services. To allow both the wife and the husband to re-
cover for the nursing services she provided would amount to double recovery.
Nor could the wife recover for the loss of her earnings and earning capacity in-
curred when she quit work to take care of her husband. Such recovery would
"allow her to accomplish indirectly that which we have just held she cannot do
directly." Id. at 409, 525 P.2d at 687, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
16. 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958).
17. 12 Cal. 3d at 387, 525 P.2d at 671, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
18. The trial court had stated:
I have never been able to justify the law which permitted a widow
to be compensated for the detriment suffered as a result of loss of com-
panionship and so forth, but at the same time won't compensate her for
the loss, together with the burden, of somebody made a vegetable as a
result of something happening to her husband. I can't see it, but I feel
kind of hide bound by the Appellate Court. That is my problem.
Id.
19. Id. at 387-88, 525 P.2d at 672, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
20. Id. at 388, 525 P.2d at 672, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 408, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782. The decision was
6-1. Justice McComb dissented, stating that this cause of action should not be
allowed without legislative approval. Id. at 409, 525 P.2d at 687, 115 Cal. Rptr.
at 783.
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In addition to overruling Deshotel,23 the Rodriguez court2 4
also overruled West v. City of San Diego, 5 which had denied a
husband the right to recover for the loss of his wife's consortium.
These cases involved fact patterns similar to the one in Rodriguez.
In each case a spouse had been so seriously injured that the abil-
ity to continue a normal marital relationship was no longer possi-
ble. In addition to the suit for damages brought by the victim,
the other spouse sought recovery for loss of consortium, 2 a term
which encompasses not only loss of support and services, but also
"love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, solace
and more. 2 7
A series of conflicting court decisions provided the basis for
holding in Rodriguez. In an early case, Meek v. Pacific Electric
Railway Co., 28 the court allowed a husband to recover for the loss
of his wife's services, but stated that damages for loss of consor-
tium were not allowed in California.29 The subsequent decision
in Gist v. French, however, rejected this view as "inadvertent dic-
tum."30  Since there was no law forbidding such recovery, the
lower appellate court had stated that "it would be unreasonable
to conclude that the loss of enjoyment of the sex relation by either
party to a marriage is not recoverable from him who caused such
loss."'
In Deshotel, the supreme court denied recovery, holding that
the quoted language from Gist also was dictum, insofar as it re-
ferred to the wife's right of recovery for loss of consortium3 2 Jus-
tice Carter wrote a vigorous dissent stating, inter alia, that the de-
cision was a denial of equal protection of the laws, since the Gist
court had allowed a similar right of recovery to a husband.3" Two
years later, in West, the supreme court completely overruled Gist
and refused to permit a husband to recover for the loss of consor-
tium of his injured wife.3 4 The West court reasoned that the com-
mon law right of recovery accorded to the husband was based on
the subservient legal position of the wife; since that theory was
no longer viable the husband should be denied recovery.35
23. 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958).
24. 12 Cal. 3d at 408, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
25. 54 Cal. 2d 469, 353 P.2d 929, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1960).
26. Id. at 472, 353 P.2d at 930, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 290; Deshotel v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 665, 328 P.2d 449 (1958).
27. Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 502, 239 N.E.2d
897, 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1968).
28. 175 Cal. 53, 164 P. 1117 (1917).
29. Id. at 56, 164 P. at 1118.
30. 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 255, 288 P.2d 1003, 1008 (1955).
31. Id. at 256, 288 P.2d at 1008.
32. 50 Cal. 2d at 667, 328 P.2d at 451.
33. Id. at 669, 328 P.2d at 452.
34. 54 Cal. 2d at 478, 353 P.2d at 934, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
35. Id. at 477, 353 P.2d at 934, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
1975]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 15
Again there was a strong dissent, this time by Justice Pe-
ters, who found the majority's reasoning unsound. 6 At common
law, the wife had no separate legal existence apart from her hus-
band; consequently she had no right to recover for the loss of his
consortium.8 7  Justice Peters argued that if the court sought to
treat husband and wife equally, it should have extended the right
to recover for loss of consortium to a wife rather than have re-
scinded the common law action accorded to a husband."' Since
the original reason for denying the wife recovery no longer ex-
isted, the rule should have ceased. Instead, as noted by the
Rodriguez majority, "the court devised new reasons of 'policy and
procedure' to justify the survival of the rule in California.""9
In order to provide a definitive answer to whether a right
of recovery should exist for loss of consortium, the Rodriguez
court investigated, evaluated, and destroyed the bases of the De-
shotel and West decisions. The court drew from the dissents in
those cases of Justices Carter and Peters, as well as from opinions
from other jurisdictions which had rejected the position taken by
the majorities in Deshotel and West.40
First, the court examined the role of stare decisis in the prior
holdings. When Deshotel was decided, the weight of authority
-both judicial and legislative-supported the common law rule
which denied the wife a right of recovery for loss of consortium. 1
By 1974, however, the position taken in Deshotel had become the
minority view 42 in the United States. Furthermore, legal schol-
36. Id. at 482, 353 P.2d at 937, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
37. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 388, 525 P.2d 669,
672, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 768 (1974), citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*442.
38. Id. at 484, 353 P.2d at 938, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
39. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 389, 525 P.2d 669,
673, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 769 (1974).
40. For examples of the decisions considered by the court, see Gates v. Foley,
247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971); Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970); Mont-
gomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); and Novak v. Kansas
City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963).
41. In 1958, only five states allowed the wife a right to recover for loss of
consortium. The Rodriguez court (12 Cal. 3d at 389 n.4, 525 P.2d at 673 n.4,
115 Cal. Rptr. at 769 n.4) pointed out that the leading case recognizing this right
was Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), overruled on other
grounds Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The po-
sition taken in Hitaffer was adopted in Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448
(D. Neb. 1953), and was also followed in Arkansas (Missouri Pac. Transp. Co.
v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957)), Georgia (Brown v. Georgia-Ten-
nessee Coaches, 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953)), and Iowa (Acuff v.
Schmitt, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956)).
42. In addition to California, thirty-one states now recognize the right to re-
cover for loss of consortium. In twenty-six states, the change has come through
judicial decisions. See, e.g., Arizona, City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 108 Ariz.
582, 503 P.2d 803 (1972); Illinois, Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d
881 (1960); Massachusetts, Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., -Mass. -, 302 N.E.2d 555
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ars and writers had been recommending for many years that the
common law rule be changed," and in 1969 the Restatement of
Torts was revised to include a right of recovery for loss of consor-
tium to a wife."'
The Rodriguez court found the destruction of the preceden-
tial foundation of Deshotel to be complete, saying:
In these circumstances we may fairly conclude that the
precedential foundation of Deshotel has been not only under-
mined but destroyed. In its place a new common law has
arisen, granting either spouse the right to recover for loss of
consortium caused by negligent injury to the other spouse.
Accordingly, to adopt that rule in California at this time
would not constitute, as the court feared in Deshotel [citation
omitted] an "extension" of common law liability, but rather
a recognition of that liability as it is currently understood by
the large preponderance of our sister states and a consensus
of distinguished legal scholars. 45
A second point emphasized by the earlier decisions was that
the common law should be changed only by the legislature.4" Yet
the West court had "modified" the common law on its own ini-
tiative by denying a husband a right of recovery for loss of consor-
(1973). For a complete list of these cases, see Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 390 n.5, 525 P.2d n.5, 669, 673 n.5, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765,
769 n.5 (1974). Five states have made the change by statute (Colorado, Missis-
sippi, New Hampshire, Oregon and Tennessee). Id. at n.6, 525 P.2d at 673-74
n.6, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70 n.6. Hawaii, Louisiana, North Dakota and Rhode
Island apparently have no definitive opinion on the issue. Id. at n.7, 525 P.2d
at 674 n.7, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 770 n.7. Virginia and Utah have statutes which
deny the wife's right by implication. Id. at n.8, 525 P.2d at 674 n.8, 115 Cal. Rptr.
at 770 n.8. And in thirteen states judicial decisions impliedly deny the right. Id.
at 391 n.9, 525 P.2d at 674 n.9, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 770 n.9. Some courts, however,
have stated that the legislature must make the change, while other decisions deny-
ing recovery are based on cases from other jurisdictions which, in many instances,
have been overruled. Deshotel is a good example. Of the twenty cases which
were cited by the court to support its decision, seventeen have now been overruled.
Id. at 390-92, 525 P.2d at 673-75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 669-71.
43. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 894 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]; Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV.
1 (1923); Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651
(1930); Simeone, The Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium-Progress or No?,
4 ST. Louis U.L. REV. 424 (1957). For further sources, see PROSSER, supra, at
894 n.5 (4th ed. 1971).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 695 (Tent. Draft. No. 14, 1969).
"Section 693 of both the first and second Restatements recognizes an identical
right of the husband to recover for loss of his wife's consortium, but includes lia-
bility for loss of her services as well." Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12
Cal. 3d 382, 392, 525 P.2d 669, 695, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 771 (1974).
45. 12 Cal. 3d at 392-93, 525 P.2d at 675, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
46. West v. City of San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 477, 353 P.2d 929, 934, 6
Cal. Rptr. 289, 294 (1960); Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664,
668-69, 328 P.2d 449, 451-52 (1958).
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tium.47  To demonstrate that the argument for legislative mandate
lacked merit, the Rodriguez court cited numerous instances in
which the California Supreme Court had first specifically held that
legislative action was required to change the law and then subse-
quently reversed its position.4 8  In each instance, the court even-
tually determined that it need not wait for the legislature to act,
especially when the doctrine involved was judicially created. As
Justice Traynor pointed out in People v. Pierce,49 for the court
not to act would be an abdication of the court's "responsibility for
the upkeep of the common law."50
The Rodriguez court also rejected the argument raised in De-
shotel51 that the wife (or husband) sustained only indirect harm
as a consequence of the defendant's wrong to the other spouse. 2
The court stated that argument had already been negated in
Dillon v. Legg.53  In that case a driver who negligently ran over
a small child was found liable to the child's mother, who had wit-
nessed the accident, for the emotional shock and subsequent phys-
ical illness she suffered.5 4  In rejecting the argument that the
mother's injury was too indirect, the Dillon court declared that the
defendant owed a duty of care to all persons who foreseeably
could be endangered by his conduct.55' It found that the driver
should reasonably have foreseen that the mother of the deceased
child would be nearby and would suffer emotional trauma from
witnessing the accident.56 In applying the Dillon reasoning to
47. 54 Cal. 2d at 482-83, 353 P.2d at 937-38, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 297-98 (Peters,
J., concurring and dissenting).
48. Talley v. Northern San Diego Hosp. Dist., 41 Cal. 2d 33, 41, 257 P.2d
22, 27 (1953) and Vater v. County of Glenn, 49 Cal. 2d 815, 820, 323 P.2d 85,
88 (1958) (the doctrine of sovereign immunity), overruled, Muskopf v. Corning
Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 213, 359 P.2d 457, 458, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90 (1961);
Lammers v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 186 Cal. 379, 384, 199 P. 523, 525 (1921) and
Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 356, 289 P.2d 450, 457 (1955) (furnishing alco-
holic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication),
overruled, Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 167, 486 P.2d 151, 160-61, 95 Cal. Rptr.
623, 632-33 (1971); Thomas v. German Gen. Benevolent Soc'y, 168 Cal. 183,
188, 141 P. 1186, 1188 (1914) (charitable institutions are immune from suit for
their tortious acts), overruled, Silva v. Providence Hosp. of Oakland, 14 Cal. 2d
762, 776, 97 P.2d 798, 805 (1939) and Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 366-
67, 232 P.2d 241, 247 (1951); People v. Miller, 82 Cal. 107, 108, 22 P. 934, 935
(1889) (when spouses conspire only between themselves, they cannot be prose-
cuted for conspiracy), overruled, People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 395 P.2d
893, 895-96, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 847-48 (1964).
49. 61 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 395 P.2d 893, 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 847 (1964).
50. Id.
51. 50 Cal. 2d at 667, 328 P.2d at 451.
52. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 399, 525 P.2d 669,
679, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 775 (1974).
53. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
54. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
55. Id. at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
56. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
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the facts in Rodriguez, the court concluded that since most adults
are married, an injury sustained by an adult could reasonably be
expected to have an adverse effect on his or her spouse.57  The
use of the reasonable man-foreseeability standard, therefore, rec-
ognizes that each spouse suffers an immediate, personal loss and
that each is entitled to recover from the responsible tortfeasor. 58
The court briefly dealt with two additional arguments raised
in the prior cases: (1) that the damages were too speculative,"9
and (2) that allowing the uninjured spouse to recover for loss of
consortium would encourage parents and children to try to enforce
similar claims.6 °
In disposing of the concern over the uncertainty of damages,
the court noted that while loss of consortium may have physical
consequences, it is primarily a form of mental suffering or emo-
tional distress. 61 Obviously, it is not possible to determine objec-
tively the extent of such suffering, nor is a monetary award likely
to compensate totally for the destruction of the marriage relation-
ship. Nevertheless, such an award is the only means available
to compensate for the loss. In California it is well established
that a plaintiff may recover for many subjective injuries related
to pain and suffering 2 even though it is not possible to measure
objectively the amount of damages sufficient to redress the emo-
tional harm caused. If a jury can, and must, determine a proper
award in such circumstances, there is no reason to believe that
it cannot do so in an action for loss of consortium."
While the court acknowledged that permitting an action for
loss of consortium might lead other family members to assert sim-
ilar causes of action, it emphasized that it would be improper to
57. 12 Cal. 3d at 399-400, 525 P.2d at 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
58. Id. at 401, 525 P.2d at 681, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 402, 525 P.2d at 682, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
61. Id. at 401, 525 P.2d at 681, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
62. PROSSER, supra note 43, at 327-28 states: "Mental suffering is no more
difficult to estimate in financial terms, and no less a real injury than 'physical
pain'...."
Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme Court has written:
[A] plaintiff may recover not only for physical pain but for fright,
nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, in-
dignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror or ordeal. (Citations omit-
ted.) Admittedly these terms refer to subjective states, representing a
detriment which can be translated into monetary loss only with great dif-
ficulty. (Citations omitted.) But the detriment, nevertheless, is a gen-
uine one that requires compensation (citations om:tted), and the issue
generally must be resolved by the "impartial conscience and judgment
of jurors who may be expected to act reasonably, intelligently and in
harmony with the evidence." (Citations omitted.)
Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 892-93, 500 P.2d 880, 883,
103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859 (1972).
63. 12 Cal. 3d at 401, 525 P.2d at 681, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
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deny an existing right of action simply because of potential future
difficulty in delineating the scope of liability.6 4  Whenever simi-
lar claims based on a family relationship arise, they will be decided
on a case-by-case basis, using as guidelines general principles of
tort law. 65 The Rodriguez court also implied that the husband-
wife relationship is legally quite different from the parent-child
relationship and that the need to extend an analogous right of re-
covery was not necessarily required.68
The fear of double recovery and the concern about the retro-
active effect of a judicial decision to allow a right of recovery for
loss of consortium were raised as additional reasons to deny the
action.6 7  The Rodriguez court did not find these problems seri-
ous and concluded that they could satisfactorily "be resolved by
procedural means."68
While a wife is entitled to her husband's financial support,
the rule against double recovery prohibits her from recovering for
such a loss when her husband has already been compensated for
his loss of earnings and earning power. The loss of this power
is personal to the husband, and he is entitled to recover for it.6"
But as has been indicated, financial support is only one element
of consortium. 70  The possibility of double recovery is not a prob-
lem when one considers the other elements of consortium, such
as sexual relations and companionship, in which both husband and
wife have personal interests which are entitled to protection.7 '
When either or both parties are deprived of these elements by
reasons of a negligent or intentional injury to one, it is obvious
that each has suffered a personal injury. Therefore, a recovery
obtained by a husband for the loss of his ability to participate in
a normal married life does not compensate his wife for the simi-
lar loss she has incurred. 72  Both should be able to recover for
the loss of an opportunity to enjoy a normal sexual relationship
and if both do, the result is not double recovery. As one court
has said, "[tihere is no duplication, instead, this is an example
of a single tortious act which harms two people by virtue of their
relationship to each other. '73
64. Id. at 403, 525 P.2d at 682, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 778 citing Dillon v. Legg,
68 Cal. 2d 728, 743-44, 441 P.2d 912, 922, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 82 (1968).
65. In other words, liability will be limited to "persons and injuries within
the scope of the reasonably foreseeable risk." 12 Cal. 3d at 403, 525 P.2d at
682, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
66. Id. at 403-04, 525 P.2d at 683, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 779. See text accom-
panying notes 81-91 infra for further discussion of this problem.
67. Id. at 404, 525 P.2d at 683, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 404-05, 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
71. ld. at 405, 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
72. Id. at 404, 525 P.2d at 683, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
73. General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 367, 498 P.2d 366, 371 (1972).
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To insure that there would be no double recovery in Rodri-
guez, Justice Mosk followed the procedural suggestion of an ear-
lier decision and advised that, upon remand, each element of the
damages be kept separate and distinct from the others."4 Further,
the court suggested that pursuant to section 378 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure,75 the claim for loss of consortium be
joined to the other spouse's cause of action for negligent or inten-
tional injury.7" The court noted the approach suggested in Diaz
v. Eli Lilly and Co.,77 that if the actions were not originally joined,
either party would normally be entitled to have them consolidated
for trial.78  Since the Rodriguez court did suggest joinder, it would
appear probable that as a practical matter most, if not all, such
suits will be joined in the future.
Finally, the court summarily dismissed the concern that a ju-
dicial decision to allow a right of recovery for loss of consortium
might have retroactive effect. The court reasoned that an action
for loss of consortium based on any claim for personal injuries to
a married person, which had already been settled, would be
barred by the statute of limitations. 70  However, "for reasons of
fairness and sound administration," the Rodriguez court held that
even if the filing of such an action were not barred by the statute
of limitations, it would be prohibited if the personal injury claim
of the injured spouse had been concluded by settlement or judg-
ment prior to the effective date of the Rodriguez decision. 0
Since the California Supreme Court so often leads the way
in changing outmoded laws, it is rather surprising that thirty-one
states recognized a wife's right to recover for loss of consortium
before California."' Now that the right has been granted to both
74. 12 Cal. 3d at 406, 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780 citing City
of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 108 Ariz. 582, 584, 503 P.2d 803, 805 (1972).
75. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 378 (West 1973) states:
(a) All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:
(1) They assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alter-
native, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or
fact common to all these persons will arise in the action; or
(2) They have a claim, right, or interest adverse to the defendant
in the property or controversy which is the subject of the action.
(b) It is not necessary that each plaintiff be interested as to every
cause of action or as to all relief prayed for. Judgment may be given
for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective right to
relief.
76. 12 Cal. 3d at 407-08 n.29, 525 P.2d at 686 n.29, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782
n.29.
77. - Mass. -, 302 N.E.2d 555, 560-61 (1973).
78. 12 Cal. 3d at 407, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
79. Id. at 408, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
80. The Rodriguez decision was handed down on August 21, 1974. Id. at
382, 525 P.2d at 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 765. Presumably this is the effective
date referred to by Justice Mosk. Id. at 408, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr.
at 782.
81. See note 35 supra.
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husband and wife in California, it seems likely that the supreme
court will be asked soon to decide whether the reasoning em-
ployed in Rodriguez is equally applicable to a child's claim for
the deprivation-analogous to loss of consortium-resulting from
an incapacitating injury to one or both of its parents.
The Rodriguez court clearly foresaw the possibility that its
decision allowing a right of action for loss of consortium to either
spouse could be used later as a basis for urging the court to recog-
nize a similar right for other family members.82  Although the
court did not appear to encourage such an extension of the doc-
trine,s it pointed out in Rodriguez, as it had in Dillon v. Legg,
that it preferred to proceed on a case-by-case basis rather than
to create "artificial islands of exceptions"8 4 which automatically
deny recovery to certain types of plaintiffs.
Even the imaginative lawyer will not find it easy to persuade
the supreme court that a child's loss of the care, companionship,
education, and affection normally provided by a parent should be
the basis of an action for money damages. For one thing, the
precedential foundation which had been so completely destroyed
in the loss of consortium area is still intact on the question of
whether a child should have an analogous right of recovery. Thus
far, in no jurisdiction has a lower court decision recognizing such
a right been upheld,85 although a number of legal writers, includ-
ing Dean Prosser, 6 have failed to understand the appellate courts'
reluctance to grant such recovery. 7
The notion espoused in Dillon that recovery should be avail-
able to all who are foreseeably harmed by a tortfeasor's actions
82. 12 Cal. 3d at 402-03, 525 P.2d at 682, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
83. The court quoted decisions from other jurisdictions which raise serious
questions as to the availability of recovery for other family members. Id. at 403-
04, 525 P.2d at 683, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
84. Id. at 403, 525 P.2d at 682, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 778, citing Dillon v. Legg,
68 Cal. 2d 728, 747, 441 P.2d 912, 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 85 (1968).
85. Scruggs v. Meredith, 134 F. Supp. 868 (D. Hawaii 1955) (allowing re-
covery to a child for losses resulting from injuries to its mother), rev'd, 244 F.2d
604 (9th Cir. 1957). The issue of a minor's right to damages for injuries to a
parent has been raised and denied in at least five other jurisdictions: Turner v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 159 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ga. 1958); Jeune v. Del E.
Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189
Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962); Hayrynen v. White Pine Copper Co., 9 Mich.
App. 452, 157 N.W.2d 502 (1968); Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wash. 2d 103,
330 P.2d 1010 (1958).
86. See PROSSER, supra note 43, at 896. See id. n.26 for other sources.
87. Id. at 896. The objections to extending the right to a child are similar
to those which were raised and overcome in the loss of consortium area-for ex-
ample, the possibility of double recovery (id. at 897), or a claim that the child's
injury is too indirect and that his recovery would lead to unlimited liability for
defendants. While the child would benefit to some degree from any recovery the
injured parent received, Prosser argues that the parent's recovery would not be
adequate to recompense the child for all that he personally has lost. Id.
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has always been well received by other courts. Although the dis-
sent in Dillon saw that decision as the first step into the "fantastic
realm of infinite liability.'"" subsequent decisions have limited its
application."9
88. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 751, 441 P.2d 912, 928, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 88 (1968)
(Burke, J., dissenting), citing Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal.
2d 295, 315, 379 P.2d 513, 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 45 (1963).
89. See, e.g., Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868
(1974). Powers was an action brought by a mother and daughter against the
truck driver who ran over the child. The child sued for her personal damages
and the mother requested separate damages for the physical and emotional pain
and distress which she suffered as a result of her daughter's accident. The mother
did not witness the accident and first saw her child's injuries some thirty to sixty
minutes later. The mother argued that Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp.,
7 Cal. 3d 889, 500 P.2d 880, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1972), stood for the existence
of a right of recovery for physical harm flowing from knowledge of an unobserved
tort. Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 873-74, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868, 873-
74 (1974). In Capelouto, the actual issue on appeal was whether an infant could
recover for pain and suffering as a result of medical malpractice. 7 Cal. 3d at
891, 500 P.2d at 881, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 857. While resolving this issue for the
plaintiff, the Capelouto court discussed, in a footnote, the parents' separate cause
of action for their own mental and physical distress arising from the defendant's
negligence. The court approved of an instruction, based on Dillon and given at
the trial, which permitted the parents to recover "reasonable compensation for any
pain, discomfort, fears, anxiety, and emotional distress suffered by the parents of
which the injury to their child was a proximate cause." Id. at 892 n.1, 500 P.2d
at 882 n.1, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 858 n.1. Justice Tobriner noted that this instruction
allowed parents to recover "for physical or mental injury sustained in the course
of caring for the child and responding to her needs...." Id. (emphasis added).
However, the Capelouto court also said that Dillon made it clear that a parent
cannot recover for witnessing a child's distress unless the parent suffers actual
physical injury. Id., citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d 912,
920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80. Given this somewhat ambiguous standard and the
strong dissent in Dillon which expressed the fear of unlimited liability for defend-
ants, the Powers court stated that it did not think it
should extend the rule to a case such as this where the shock, as claimed,
resulted from seeing the daughter 30 to 60 minutes after the accident
and thereafter under circumstances not materially different from those
undergone by every parent whose child has been injured in a nonob-
served and antecedent accident.
See also Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center of East Bay, 31 Cal. App.
3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973). Jansen was an action by a mother for her in-
fant's wrongful death due to an improper diagnosis of the child's condition. The
mother was not allowed to recover for her emotional trauma and subsequent physi-
cal injury caused by witnessing the progressive decline and ultimate death of her
child because, the court said, Dillon contemplated a sudden and brief event causing
the child's injury, which was subject to sensory perception. Id. at 24, 106 Cal.
Rptr. at 884. But cf. Employers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Foust, 29 Cal. App. 3d 382,
105 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). In that case the court held that damages for physical
injury which resulted from the emotional distress caused by a child's accident
were recoverable by the parents under an insurance policy which covered all
bodily injury resulting from an accident. The mother witnessed the accident and
the father learned of it within ten minutes. Both suffered severe fright, shock,
emotional distress and resulting physical injury. Id. at 387, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 508;
accord, Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
The Archibald court held that a mother was entitled to recover damages for the
mental and emotional illness requiring institutionalization, which she sustained as
a result of witnessing her child's injuries within moments of the event. Id. at 255-
56, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25.
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The California Supreme Court will undoubtedly consider the
closeness of the family relationship in deciding whether, in a given
factual context, to extend Rodriguez.9 It seems obvious that se-
vere emotional harm to a child is likely to result when the parent-
child relationship is damaged by incapacitation of the parent. In
many instances a brother or sister of a seriously injured person
could also be expected to suffer considerable emotional distress.
While there is no denying the fact that other relatives and close
friends may be greatly affected by an incapacitating injury to
someone they care for deeply, reason and pure economics dictate
that lines must be drawn. One approach the court could take in
drawing such a line, should it decide later to extend Rodriguez,
is that followed by California's wrongful death statute: it could
limit the class of permissible plaintiffs seeking recovery analogous
to loss of consortium to the heirs at law or dependent parents of
the injured victim."
The Rodriguez decision, in permitting the spouse of a negli-
gently or intentionally injured person to bring an action for loss
of consortium, recognizes, albeit belatedly, an important legal
right. It is to be expected that the supreme court will soon be
called upon to decide whether the principles espoused in Rodri-
guez are sufficiently broad to dictate that a similar right of action
be extended at least to a dependent child who has been deprived
of the comfort and companionship of its parent as a result of the
tortious act of a third party.92
Joyce Elaine Allegro Dougherty
90. The closeness of the family relationship was one of the factors which the
Dillon court considered in reaching its conclusion that the harm suffered by the
mother was reasonably foreseeable. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 80.
91. The California Wrongful Death statute allows the heirs and dependent
parents who are not heirs to bring an action against the person causing the death.
It provides that "such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of
the case, may be just .... ." CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 377 (West 1973).
92. Such an extension of Rodriguez is suggested by a recent decision of the
court of appeal (February 25, 1975). Based on the reasoning in Rodriguez, the
court held in Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 545, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 639, 644 (1975), that
no reasonable distinction can be drawn between the right of parents,
in appropriate circumstances, to seek recovery for lost comfort, society
and companionship of an injured and totally helpless child and the
right of a spouse, in similar circumstances, to seek recovery for loss of
consortium as authorized by Rodriguez.
Since the court found that the law favored the parent-child relationship suf-
ficiently to allow the parent to recover for lost comfort, society and companion-
ship (id. at 545-46, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 644), it may be inferred that, at least in
this court, reciprocal rights would be accorded to a child whose parent had been
severely injured or incapacitated.
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES-CALIFORNIA LAW BARS RECOV-
ERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL DEATH-
SURVIVAL TYPE ACTIONS-Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974), hearing denied
(June 19, 1974).
In the early afternoon of June 25, 1968, a light Beechcraft
airplane took off on a routine equipment test flight from Fullerton
airport. The small private plane climbed to approximately 350
feet, made a shallow right turn and climbed again to about 650
feet. At this point ithe pilot began another right turn when, sud-
denly, the engine failed and the plane crashed to the ground kill-
ing all four occupants.'
The heirs of the crash victims and the owner of -the airplane
joined in an action against the airplane manufacturer for damages
resulting from the deaths of the occupants and destruction of the
aircraft.2 The evidence indicated that the crash resulted from a
defectively designed fuel system in the airplane,3 and the jury
awarded $4,497,000' in compensatory damages to the plaintiffs
based on strict liability in tort.' Finding the defendants' issuance
of a certificate of airworthiness on the defective airplane prior to
the crash to constitute misrepresentation and fraudulent conceal-
ment of a defect,' the jury awarded a total of $17,250,000 in puni-
tive damages to the heirs and to the owner of the airplane.7
Because of a deficient instruction to the jury on the elements
of fraud, the trial judge ordered a new trial as to punitive damages,
but denied a new -trial as to compensatory damages after the plain-
tiffs agreed to remittiturs. s All parties appealed.' The California
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held that the evidence of
defectively designed fuel cells was sufficient to establish the cause
of the crash.10  In addition, the court ruled that regardless of
whether there was error in the lower court's decision to grant a
new trial as to punitive damages in favor of the heirs, a new trial
could not be granted because of California's rule barring punitive
1. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 456-57, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 416, 420 (1974).
2. Id. at 453, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
3. Id. at 459, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
4. Id. at 454, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
5. Id. at 467, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
6. Id. at 462, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
7. Id. at 454, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. id. at 459, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
1 9751
SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 15
damages in a wrongful death action." The court of appeal af-
firmed the judgment of the lower court granting a new trial as
to punitive damages in favor of the owner of the airplane.' 2 The
court found that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury prop-
erly on elements of fraud did not invalidate the compensatory
damage award, and the appeal of the order denying a new trial
as to compensatory damages was dismissed.' 3
The plaintiffs in Pease sought to recover punitive damages
under both California's wrongful death statute"4 and California's
survival statute.' 5 Although these two statutes are frequently con-
fused with each other, they constitute entirely separate causes of
action.' 6 Wrongful death actions are intended to compensate
heirs of a decedent for losses they have sustained as a result of
11. Id. at 462, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 424, see infra notes 19, 22.
12. Id. at 474, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
13. Id. at 468, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
14. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 377 (West 1973) provides:
When the death of a person not being a minor, or when the death
of a minor person who leaves surviving him either a husband or wife
or child or children or father and mother, is caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of another, his heirs, and his dependent parents, if any, who
are not heirs, or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain
an action for damages against the person causing the death, or in the
case of the death of such wrongdoer, against the personal representative
of such wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the death
of the person injured. If any other person is responsible for any such
wrongful act or neglect, the action may also be maintained against such
other person, or in case of his death, his personal representatives. In
every action under this section, such damages may be given as under all
the circumstances of the case, may be just, but shall not include damages
recoverable under Section 573 of the Probate Code. The respective
rights of the heirs and dependent parents in any award shall be deter-
mined by the court. Any action brought by the personal representatives
of the decedent pursuant to the provisions of Section 573 of the Probate
Code may be joined with an action arising out of the same wrongful act
or neglect brought pursuant to the provisions of this section. If an ac-
tion be brought pursuant to the provisions of this section and a separate
action arising out of the same wrongful act or neglect be brought pursu-
ant to the provisions of Section 573 of the Probate Code, such actions
shall be consolidated for trial on the motion of any interested party.
15. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West Supp. 1974) provides:
Except as provided in this section no cause of action shall be lost
by reason of the death of any person but may be maintained by or
against his executor or administrator.
In an action brought under this section against an executor or ad-
ministrator all damages may be awarded which might have been recov-
ered against the decedent had he lived except damages awardable under
Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for
the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
When a person having a cause of action dies before judgment, the
damages recoverable by his executor or administrator are limited to such
loss or damage as the decedent sustained or incurred prior to his death,
including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the dece-
dent would have been entitled to recover had he lived, and shall not in-
clude damages for pain, suffering or disfigurement.
16. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 744 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as SPEISER].
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the decedent's death. 17  Survival statutes, on the other hand, are
designed to allow recovery by the personal representative of the
deceased for damages the decedent himself might have recovered
had he survived. 8
The Pease court made clear its approval of the long-standing
policy of California courts denying the existence of a right to puni-
tive damages in favor of the heirs of a deceased in actions brought
under California's wrongful death statute.19 The court also de-
cided that the facts in Pease did not warrant an award of punitive
damages to the heirs under the survival statute.20 Finally, the
Pease court concluded that there is no right to punitive damages
in California independent of statute.2
The court began its analysis by tracing the history of Cali-
fornia's rule against the recoverability of punitive damages in
wrongful death actions. In 1874, the California Legislature
amended the wrongful death statute by striking the words "pecuni-
ary and exemplary" from its text.22 The court then cited the early
case of Lange v. Schoettler,23 which established the proposition
that the purpose of the 1874 amendment was to deny the right
to punitive damages in wrongful death actions.24 In Lange, the
California Supreme Court held erroneous a jury instruction which
permitted an award of punitive damages "if the act causing the
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 462, 113 Cal. Rptr.
416, 424 (1974).
20. Id. at 459-60, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
21. Id. at 462, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
22. Compare original CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 377 (Springer 1872), which
provides:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or ne-
glect of another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an
action for damages against the person causing the death; or when the
death of a person is caused by an injury received in falling through any
opening or defective place in any sidewalk, street, alley, square, or
wharf, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for
damages against the person whose duty it was, at the time of the injury,
to have kept in repair such sidewalk or other place. In every such ac-
tion the jury may give such damages, pecuniary or exemplary, as, under
all the circumstances of the case, may to them seem just ....
with the first amended CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 377 (Sumner, Whitney & Co.
1883) (emphasis added), which stated:
When the death of a person, not being a minor, is caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs or personal representatives
may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the
death, or if such person be employed by another who is responsible for
his conduct, then also against such other person. In every action under
this and the preceding section, such damages may be given as under all
the circumstances of the case may be just. [In effect July 1st, 1874].
For the present version see CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 377 (West 1973).
23. 115 Cal. 388, 47 P. 139 (1896).
24. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 462, 113 Cal. Rptr.
416, 424 (1974).
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death was wanton, cruel, and malicious. '"25
As further support for its denial of punitive damages to the
heirs in Pease, the court cited Doak v. Superior Court.2 Doak
involved a proceeding for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Los
Angeles Superior Court from enforcing an order requiring peti-
tioners to answer certain interrogatories in plaintiffs' wrongful
death action. The plaintiffs in Doak were attempting to justify
pretrial discovery of the defendant's financial status for the pur-
pose of recovering punitive damages.27
Although the question of recoverability of punitive damages
in wrongful death actions was a secondary issue in Doak, the court
held therein that since punitive damages were not recoverable in
a wrongful death action, the plaintiffs' attempt to ascertain the de-
fendant's financial status for the purpose of recovering punitive
damages was improper.28
The Pease court also cited with approval Fox v. Oakland
Consolidated Street Railway.29 In Fox, the California Supreme
Court reversed a $6000 judgment awarded to the plaintiff for the
death of his infant son.80 Because the plaintiff's award was so
out of proportion -to the injury sustained, the court concluded that
the verdict was "prompted by improper motives on the part of the
jury" and set it aside.3
In denying punitive damages to the heirs of the four occu-
pants of the ill-fated Beechcraft airplane, the Pease court also re-
lied on Estate of Riccomi32 and Carr v. Pacific Telephone Co."3
Riccomi involved a suit instituted by the mother of a deceased son
against the son's wife to obtain one-half of a $3000 settlement paid
to the latter for claims arising out of the son's death. The court
held that money recovered under California's wrongful death stat-
ute is intended solely for the benefit of the heirs to compensate
them for the pecuniary loss they have sustained as a result of a
relative's death. 4 Since Riccomi's mother had suffered minimal
pecuniary loss from her son's death, the California Supreme Court
25. Lange v. Schoettler, 115 Cal. 388, 390, 47 P. 139 (1896). The Lange
court noted that California's wrongful death statute of 1862 (Stat. 1862, at 447)
specifically authorized the awarding of exemplary damages, but that the purpose
of the 1874 amendment of section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "must have
been to take away the right to exemplary damages." Id. at 391, 47 P. at 139.
26. 257 Cal. App. 2d 825, 65 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968).
27. Id. at 827, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
28. Id. at 838, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
29. 118 Cal. 55, 50 P. 25 (1897).
30. Id. at 68, 50 P. at 29.
31. Id.
32. 185 Cal. 458, 197 P. 97 (1921).
33. 26 Cal. App. 3d 537, 103 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1972).
34. Estate of Riccomi, 185 Cal. 458, 460, 197 P. 97, 98 (1921).
[Vol. 15
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
held she was not entitled to the one-half share of the recovery
she claimed"3 and affirmed the trial court judgment against her.3 6
Although there was no mention of punitive damages in Ric-
comi,317 the Pease court cited the case as support for its contention
that California's wrongful death statute was enacted solely to com-
pensate heirs for losses resulting from the death of a decedent,
not to punish the tortfeasor for his wrong.3 8
Carr v. Pacific Telephone Co. was a wrongful death action
brought by the widow of a tree trimmer who had been killed by
a tree trunk which had accidentally bounced off an unusually taut
telephone line. Carr's widow, appealing a lower court judgment
for the defendant, argued that it was reversible error for the judge
to instruct the jury on the defense of assumption of the risk, which
she maintained did not apply in this case.3 9 The Court of Appeal
for the Fourth District reversed the lower court and ordered a new
trial because of error in the jury instruction. 40
The Pease court considered the Carr decision important be-
cause it set out the three basic elements of damages recoverable
in actions brought pursuant to California's wrongful death stat-
ute: 41
1. the present value of future contributions from the dece-
dent to his surviving heirs;
2. the value of any personal service, advice or training that
probably would have been given; and
3. the value of the decedent's society and companionship. 42
By limiting recovery to direct pecuniary loss sustained by a dece-
dent's heirs, Carr clearly affirmed California's longstanding rule
barring punitive damages in wrongful death actions.
In light of these cases, the Pease court refused to "exercise
legislative power"43 by creating a right to punitive damages. The
decision of the Pease court follows the majority position in the
United States.44 States which permit punitive damages in wrong-
35. Id. at 462, 197 P. at 98.
36. Id. at 459, 197 P. at 97.
37. The only issue in the case was whether the $3000 settlement was properly
distributed among the decedent's heirs. Id. at 459, 197 P. at 97.
38. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 461, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 424 (1974).
39. Carr v. Pacific Tel. Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 537, 542, 103 Cal. Rptr. 120,
124 (1972).
40. Id. at 546, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
41. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 461, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 424 (1974).
42. Carr v. Pacific Tel. Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 537, 545, 103 Cal. Rptr. 120,
126 (1972).
43. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 462, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 424 (1974).
44. Comment, Punitive Damages in Wrongful Death, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
301, 302-03 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
Federal courts are among those that allow recovery of punitive damages in
federal wrongful death actions, even if the federal cause of action is brought in
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ful death actions generally do so because their respective legisla-
tures have enacted statutes expressly permitting such recovery.
In addition, some courts have allowed recovery of punitive dam-
ages because their wrongful death statutes have been judicially
construed so as to permit recovery of such damages.4" The
present trend in jurisdictions which allow punitive damages in
wrongful death actions is to permit such recovery where the dece-
dent is killed as a result of willful or wanton misconduct on the
part of the wrongdoer.46
Many of the jurisdictions which allow recovery of punitive
damages in wrongful death actions do so because courts and legis-
latures tend to confuse the purpose of a wrongful death statute 4 7 -
to create a new cause of action in the heirs of a deceased based
on the fact of death 48-with the purpose of a survival statute-
to permit the representative of a deceased to recover damages the
deceased himself might have recovered had he lived. 49
Because of the differences between the wrongful death and
survival statutes, the damages normally recoverable in each differ
as well.50 The plaintiff in a survival action usually recovers the
same damages he or she would recover in a personal injury suit,
that is compensatory relief for the injury itself, and for accompany-
state courts of jurisdictions which do not allow the recovery of punitive damages
in state wrongful death actions. See generally 10 A.L.R. FED. 511 t1972) and
cases cited therein. The recoverability of punitive damages in federal wrongful
death actions evolved in an interesting fashion. The statutes involved are the
Federal Employee's Liability Act (45 U.S.C. § 51 (1972)), which grants a wrong-
ful death right of action to heirs of railroad employees, and the Jones Act (46
U.S.C. § 688 (1958)), which grants the same right to heirs of seamen. Both
Acts are silent on the specific issue of punitive damages, but a sizeable number
of federal courts have held that punitive damages are recoverable in a proper sit-
uation. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1969) (an action under the Jones Act); Kozar
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 320 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (an F.E.L.A.
action).
To resolve the dilemma of how to apply the acts uniformly in view of the
variance that exists among the states on the issue, federal courts have held that
when the punitive damages issue arises in an F.E.L.A. or Jones Act action brought
in a state court, the Acts themselves and common law principles applied in federal
courts govern. Dice v. Akron C. & Y.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Ellis v. Union
P. Ry. Co., 329 U.S. 649 (1947); Bailey v. Central V.R., Inc., 319 U.S. 350
(1943). Thus, if punitive damages would properly be awarded in an F.E.L.A.
or Jones Act action under federal law, but the case is brought in a state court,
the state court would be obliged to permit the award, even if the particular state's
law prohibited such an award. Gee v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 163 App. Div. 274,
148 N.Y.S. 882 (1914).
45. Tripp v. Choate, 415 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1967); Hardin v. Sellers, 270 Ala.
156, 117 So. 2d 383 (1960); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 384, 391-92 (1935).
46. Comment, supra note 44, at 308.
47. SPEISER, supra note 16, at 744.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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ing mental anguish or pain and suffering."' In wrongful death
actions, on the other hand, recovery is limited to the loss of pecuni-
ary benefits to the heirs resulting from the death of the relative.5 2
Apparently realizing the difficulty they would encounter in
attempting to recover punitive damages under California's wrong-
ful death statute, the plaintiffs in Pease also contended that they
should recover punitive damages under the survival statute.53 It
has long been the position in many jurisdictions that punitive dam-
ages are recoverable if properly brought under a state's survival
statute.5 4  Courts in these jurisdictions have relied upon the
premise that there is no reason why a wrongdoer should be pun-
ished for fraudulent or malicious conduct when a party is injured,
but not when a party is killed. 5 Moreover, these courts have ar-
gued that since the purpose of survival statutes is to preserve those
causes of action which existed at the time of the decedent's death,
the personal representative of the victim, who could have brought
the action before death, should be allowed to do so after the
death. 56
Although the Pease court construed California's survival stat-
ute as allowing possible recovery of punitive damages by the per-
sonal representatives of the deceased for those causes of action
"sustained or incurred prior to death," 57 the court summarily re-
jected the plaintiffs' contention that causes of action which might
sustain punitive damages did in fact arise prior to the deaths of
the airplane's occupants. 58 In order to have allowed recovery of
punitive damages in the Pease case, the court would have had to
accept the plaintiffs' argument that a cause of action warranting
51. Id. at 750-52.
52. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 906 (4th ed. 1971), [hereinafter cited as PROS-
SER].
53. 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 422-23 (1974).
54. See also Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1327 (1959). The following cases are ex-
amples of decisions in which the recovery of punitive damages under a survival
statute was allowed: Hennigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.
Pa.), affd, 400 F.2d 851 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1968);
Leahy v. Morgan, 275 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Iowa 1967); State ex rel. Smith v.
Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1973); Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co. Inc., 267
Md. 147, 297 A.2d 721 (1972); Atlas Properties Inc. v. Didich, 226 So. 2d 684
(Fla. 1969).
55. Leahy v. Morgan, 275 F. Supp. 424, 425 (N.D. Iowa 1967); State ex rel.
Smith v. Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55, 60 (Mo. 1973); Atlas Properties Inc. v. Didich,
226 So. 2d 684, 689 (Fla. 1969).
56. Hennigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 282 F. Supp. 667, 683 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 400 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1968); Atlas Prop-
erties Inc. v. Didich, 226 So. 2d 684, 689 (Fla. 1969).
57. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 459-60, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 416, 422.
58. As the court said: "It must be said no cause of action arose during the
lifetimes of any of the four for damages to personal property. Therefore no such
cause of action survived." Id.
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punitive damages arose on the behalf of each occupant prior to
the crash.
The final argument advanced by the plaintiffs in their at-
tempt to recover punitive damages was that there exists in Cali-
fornia, independent of statute, a right to punitive damages. Plain-
tiffs cited a recent United States Supreme Court decision,
Moragne v. States Marine Lines Inc.,"0 as support for their conten-
tion. In Moragne, the widow of a deceased longshoreman sued
a shipping company for the wrongful death of her husband. The
case had been dismissed in federal district court, where it was de-
termined that the widow had no cause of action in light of earlier
United States Supreme Court opinions which had denied the exist-
ence of a cause of action for wrongful death in the absence of
a statute. 0° The court rejected the common law rule denying a
right to a civil cause of action for the wrongful death of a dece-
dent and permitted the widow to pursue her case against States
Marine Lines. 6'
The Pease court reasoned that while Moragne may have cre-
ated a right to a wrongful death cause of action in the heirs of
a decedent under federal maritime law, it did not follow that the
plaintiffs in Pease had a right to punitive damages independent
of California law, which bars punitive damages in wrongful death
actions.0 2
Along with the problem of whether to allow punitive dam-
ages in wrongful death-survival actions, the Pease case poses the
59. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
60. Id. at 379.
61. The basic thrust of the Moragne decision was to overrule The Harrisburg,
119 U.S. 199 (1886), a case in which the Supreme Court reversed an award of
damages against the defendants for a negligent condition on their ship which had
caused the death of the decedent. The Harrisburg decision was based on Mobile
Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1878), a case which held that American
common law was in accord with the English common law principle that "no civil
action lies for an injury which results in death." Id. at 756.
The Court in The Harrisburg acknowledged that its decision to support the
ancient English principle "had little justification except in primitive English legal
history, a history far removed from the American law of remedies for maritime
deaths." Moragne v. States Marine Lines Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 379 (1970). Justice
Harlan, writing for the majority in Moragne, pointed out that all American juris-
dictions have enacted wrongful death statutes in one form or another, primarily
to remedy the injustice of denying recovery for the pecuniary loss sustained by
heirs of a decedent for his or her wrongful death, Id. at 388, 390.
California's first wrongful death statute was enacted in 1862 (Stat. 1862 at
447). It was based on Lord Campbell's Act (Vict., c. 93 at 531-32 (1846)), an
English law adopted in 1846 to abrogate the harsh common law rule. Id. at 389.
Lord Campbell's Act has been deemed the progenitor of California's wrongful
death law. Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 194, 288 P.2d 12, 18 (1955),
reh. denied, 289 P.2d 242 (1955).
62. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 462, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 416, 423 (1974).
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important question of whether punitive damages should be al-
lowed in airplane products liability cases as a means of demon-
strating to manufacturers the need to exercise greater care in the
design and production of their aircraft. California courts recently
have allowed the recovery of punitive damages against corpora-
tions in products liability cases. In a leading case, Toole v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell Inc.,6 3 a California court accepted plaintiffs' con-
tention that, in view of the defendant drug company's knowledge
of the toxic effects of a certain drug, the defendant had acted
"recklessly and in wanton disregard of possible harm to others in
marketing, promoting, and maintaining" 4 a drug on the market
which had caused serious health problems to unsuspecting users.
The Toole court held that because defendant had withheld infor-
mation regarding the toxic side effects of the drug from the public,
malice-in-fact existed and sufficient foundation had been estab-
lished to permit the recovery of punitive damages.65 The Toole
court allowed an award of $250,000 in punitive damages to the
plaintiff. 66
Since California is a state which allows punitive damages in
products liability cases, the Pease court was in a position to have
permitted the award of punitive damages to stand against Beech
Aircraft Corporation. California is a strict products liability juris-
diction 7 and to have allowed punitive damages in Pease would
have been consistent with the public policy considerations that
underlie the state's imposition of a strict liability standard in
products liability cases. These considerations include (1) the no-
tion that the law should provide the maximum legal protection
possible to protect the public from injury which results from de-
fectively manufactured products, and (2) the idea that the law
should also serve to deter manufacturers from producing defective
products in the future.6 8
Allowing punitive damages in Pease also would have been
consistent with the modern trend in aviation products liability law
63. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398, Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 988 (1967). The Pease court cited Toole with ap-
proval. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 427 (1974). Another case
allowing punitive damages in a products liability suit was Moore v. Jewel Tea Co.,
116 111. App. 2d 253, 253 N.E.2d 636, aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 788, 263 N.E.2d 103
(1970).
64. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 715, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 416, Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 988, 1016 (1967).
65. Id.
66. id. at 717, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 418, Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1018 (1967).
67. Sealy v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 145, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Product Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
68. PROSSER, supra note 49, at 651.
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towards imposing stringent standards of care on airplane manufac-
turers in the production of aircraft.69 This insistence on great care
in airplane design and manufacture is founded on a realization by
courts of the lethal hazard that even a slight mechanical malfunc-
tion in an airplane can pose to its occupants. 70
Because the purpose of a wrongful death action is limited
to compensating the heirs of a decedent for loss of pecuniary ben-
efits, the better reasoned cases bar punitive damages in wrongful
death actions. 71 However, since the purpose of survival statutes
is to permit recovery by a decedent's personal representative for
damages the deceased might have recovered had he lived, the
Pease court could have relied upon California's survival statute to
sustain an award of punitive damages on the ground that a valid
cause of action (that is, misrepresentation or fraudulent conceal-
ment of a defect) did in fact arise prior to the deaths of the air-
plane's occupants.
Because of the need for change in California's wrongful
death-survival law, it is unfortunate that the Pease case was denied
a hearing by the California Supreme Court. Perhaps, the court
declined review because of the huge $17,250,000 punitive dam-
age award it would have had to allow had it decided to recognize
plaintiff's right to punitive damages.
Whatever the reason for the supreme court's decision not
to hear the case, the court of appeal decision was unfortunate
for two reasons. First, because the opinion bars an award of puni-
tive damages against an airplane manufacturer for the deaths
which resulted from the use of their defective product, the deci-
sion was a major setback to the interests of the public in using
-the law as a means of requiring airplane manufacturers to exercise
the greatest possible care in the design and production of aircraft.
Secondly, because the Pease court failed to allow punitive dam-
ages to be awarded in a survival action, the court, in effect, sus-
,tained an anomaly in California law which sanctions punitive dam-
ages against a wrongdoer only if the victim of the misconduct lives,
and prohibits the same damages when a victim dies.
Zachary E. Zwerdling
69. Maloney, Current Trends in Aviation Products Liability Law, 36 J. AIR
LAw 514, 528 (1970).
70. 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 15.02 at 15.2-15.3 (Mathew
Bender 1974).
71. SPEISER, supra note 16, at 743-57.
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